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EDITORS I NOI'E: The following papers 
by Professors Blatz and Sapontzis were 
presented at the meeting of the Society 
for the Study of Ethics and Animals held 
in Los Angeles, california, on March 27, 
1986. These papers were presented in 
response to cormnents by Professor Dale 
Jamieson. Unfortunately, Prof. Jamie-
son I s camnents are not available for 
publication at this time. However, the 
follaHing two paragraphs by Prof. Jamie-
son will serve to set the scene for the 
papers by Blatz and Sapontzis: 
Three different kinds of arguments are 
typically employed by animal liberation-
ists. First, it is sanetimes argued 
that non-human animals are like us in 
ways that matter: they are conscious 
beings who can suffer or enjoy life, and 
just as it is a bad thing for us to 
suffer, so it is a bad thing for them to 
suffer. Second, it is sanetimes argued 
that our bad treabnent of non-human 
animals is wrong for characteralogical 
reasons: it both expresses what kind of 
people we are, and contributes to making 
us worse. Finally, it is sometimes 
argued that animals are innocent, and so 
do not deserve their fate at the hands 
of experimenters, slaughterers, hunters, 
and so forth. 
This last argument--which I call the 
Innocence Argument--is one that I have 
felt uneasy about for quite sane time, 
though in a paper that I jointly au-
thored with Tom Regan, a version of it 
was endorsed. In this talk I would like 
to dig a little deeper into the Inno-
cence Argument. In particular, I would 
like to see in what sense animals can be 
said to be innocent, and try to under-
stand what implications, if any, this 
might have for how we ought to treat 
them. 
Animals can be innocent, though not in 
the way that moral agents can be. So say 
Dale Jamieson and TOm Regan in a recent arti-
cle.[l] In what follows, I want to examine 
what leads them to this conclusion and to 
assess whether or not they were led astray. 
My ultimate concern is not a critical one, 
however. Instead, I would like to gather 
certain elements of a theory of full and 
diminished responsibility and try to place 
some non-humans within that theory. It is in 
these tenns, I believe, that we need to dis-
cuss questions of non-human innocence. In 
closing, I offer sane notes on the implica-
tions of these points for questions of the 
legitimacy of using animals as experimental 
subjects. 
That's What They Say 
So what do Jamieson and Regan take as 
establishing that animals are not responsible 
for their actions? The answer seems more 
than a bit elusive to me. However, it might 
amount to the following. [2] Non-humans have 
no choice in what they do; therefore, they 
cannot be guilty for what they do. Indeed, 
it is urged that they cannot be sensibly said 
to be guilty. An alleged irmnediate conse-
quence of this is that they cannot be sensib-
ly said to be innocent either. If non-humans 
cannot be guilty, however, they can do no 
wrong. They cannot be faulted for their 
actions, and, perhaps as a consequence of 
this, they cannot be accused of acting wrong-
ly, either. Thus, they are not responsible 
for their actions, as are moral or, presumab-
ly, any ethical agents; they are not liable 
to blame or punishment for their deeds.To be 
either, as I understand Jamieson and Regan, 
they would have to be the proper objects of 
treatment inflicted as just deserts for an 
offense of which they were guilty. 
Also, as chronically non-guilty, it 
seems they would not be accountable, not such 
that they could be justifiably called upon to 
defend themselves. [3] No doubt. Jamieson 
and Regan would add that it would not even 
make sense to hold them to account, to call 
upon them for a defense of their behavior. 
But this is not all. Jamieson and Regan 
even suggest that as chronically non-guilty, 
animals are not responsible in another way: 
they cannot even be said to "do wrong. "[ 4] 
They cannot even be accorded the status of an 
agent of an act that is wrong. 
BETWEEN THE SPECIES 4 
Animals, then, utterly lack responsibil-
ity for wrong action. They do not or cannot 
deserve blame or pmishment. They cannot be 
justifiably held to account. Indeed, they 
cannot even be the agents of acts that are 
wrong. Absence of avoidability makes for a 
chronic absence of guilt. In the bargain, it 
guarantees freedan fran responsibility, as 
well as freedan fran innocence as an ethical 
agent. 
This does not mean that animals are not 
innocent in sane other way, however. Non-
humans can be said to suffer wrong without 
deserving it. And this fact, according to 
Jamieson and Regan, gives us another "intel-
ligible sense of 'innocence "' to apply to 
animals, namely, that of being the undeserv-
ing recipient of harm. 
Well, what about all of this? Are non-
. humans beyond blameworthiness, punishabili-
ty, accountability, and the perfonnance of 
acts that are wrong? Are they such that they 
"cannot be innocent (or for that matter can-
not be guilty or responsible) in the sense 
that moral agents can be said to be"?[S] Are 
they innocent in sane other sense, as in 
"innocent victims"? There is much to be said 
here. 
Innocence and Guilt 
First, it seems highly artificial to 
speak of a being's innocence outside of the 
context of questions of responsibility. We 
are asked to assign innocence to the unde-
serving recipients of mistreatment. Children 
are innocent victims in war, as are other 
civilians. Non-human animals might be seen 
to be the innocent victims of a researcher's 
quest for tenure, and so it goes. Here, 
supposedly, we have examples of innocence 
where there is no tie to the absence of guilt 
or responsibility for wrong acts. But is 
this really so? What, after all, are we 
saying when we claim that someone is the 
undeserving recipient of harm, unless it is 
that the creature has done nothing to merit 
such treatrnent--that is, is guilty of, or 
responsible for, nothing which might justify 
this harm? Talk of the degree of innocence 
in innocent victims bears this out. Children 
and other beings are such completely innocent 
victims in war and other life destructive 
enterprises, simply because they have done 
nothing to deserve their suffering. 
No doubt, the reply will be that I have 
missed an important sense of the term "inno-
cent. " But should that reply be availing? 
Senses and Nonsense 
The second canplaint I have enters just 
here against Jamieson's and Regan's approach. 
We must not treat the issues of animal inno-
cence and responsibility as matters to be 
decided by appeals to the various senses of 
the words "innocent" and "guilty." In the 
first place, and as many have argued, we 
cannot make good sense of talk about a sense, 
or the several different senses, of terms of 
utterances. And even if we could make sense 
of senses, it is a mistake to treat the 
questions of animal innocence and responsi-
bility as questions of meanings, as though 
the answers to these inquiries are matters of 
definition, as opposed to normative theory. 
Let me concentrate on that last point for a 
moment. 
Even if we could make sense of the talk 
of different senses and determine how to find 
the sense(s) of a term, and even if in fol-
lowing those procedures, we were to end up 
determining that in the sense that the terms 
"responsible" and "innocent" apply to ethical 
agents, they do not apply to non-human ani-
mals, the question would still be whether we 
ought not change the sense (s) of those terms 
and embrace an ethic in which animals are 
responsible, guilty, or innocent for the same 
reasons as are humans. Our question is what 
sort of ethic to have, one that accords non-
human animals a place in the arena of respon-
sible action or one that does not. And that 
is a question of basic ethical theory. It is 
not to be answered by sane appeal to the 
sense of the terms used to articulate that 
theory. At least, it is not unless we are to 
beg the very question at issue. [6] 
Perhaps, Jamieson and Regan were speak-
ing of senses merely as a matter of conveni-
ence, and I ought not hold them to that 
terminology or to the attached methodology. 
Well then, let my remarks serve only as a 
means to focus the discussion. 
Let me take up the question of whether, 
in a defensible ethic, animals are (or can 
be) innocent, guilty, or even responsible for 
wrong acts. Now, how might we proceed to 
answer this question, to select between non-
human inclusive and exclusive theories of 
responsibility? Any attempt to settle the 
problem by an appeal to an ethical standard 
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will be question begging. And yet, what else 
besides such an appeal would be availing? 
Elsewhere, I have argued that at such junc-
tures we need not resort to caprice but, 
instead, can and should fall back, at least 
partially, upon pragmatic concerns, taking 
what I have called lithe functionalist ap-
proach."[7] In particular, I have pointed 
out that if an ethic is acceptable, then it 
has point; it has some feature(s) in virtue 
of which the code can make some impact upon 
our lives. In order to decide between two or 
more competing ethics, we then need at least 
to identify which has structural features 
that will give it point as an ethic. I'Ve need 
to select that code with features allowing it 
to make all the differences to our lives for 
which we might have any ethic. Not beg9in9 
the question in such a procedure, then, will 
come out of not selecting codes whose point 
is described in ways unsatisfied by the point 
of any other ethic. 
With respect to more particular features 
by which ethical theories differ, if we are 
to decide between two or more ethics on a 
functionalist approach, we would decide in 
favor of that one with structural features 
enabling it to make the particular difference 
to our lives that any ethic is supposed to 
make by virtue of the feature(s) whose parti-
cular shape is under discussion. And, of 
course, in deciding these matters, we must, 
in the first place, describe the particular 
purpose or the desired impact in question in 
a way that does not assume one or another of 
the contending ethical theories. 
Should two theories serve that purpose 
equally well, then there would be nothing on 
which to base a choice between them. At 
least there would be nothing of a functional-
ist sort that is decisive specifically with 
respect to the feature in question. Perhaps, 
more general functionalist features such as 
over-all simplicity of application or norma-
tive decision making power can be decisive in 
such a case. Or, perhaps there is some other 
non-functionalist desideratum that will pre-
vail in such a case, something besides a 
question begging appeal to conservation of 
pre-theoretic, normative intuitions! (But, 
perhaps not. That is a question for another 
time. )[8] 
MOre specifically, for ex&~le, if we 
must choose between two or more ethics dif-
fering in who or what they allow to be re-
sponsible and, in what they allow those 
beings to be responsible for, then, in pur-
suit of an ethic with point, we would select 
that code that most campletely allows us to 
serve the purposes for which we have any 
ethic with a theory of responsibility. And 
the first order of business would be to state 
the point of such codes in a non-question 
begging way. 
Let I s try out this approach. Like Ja-
mieson and Regan, let's ask which theories of 
responsibility, animal inclusive or animal 
exclusive, do or do not make sense. The 
sense we shall be concerned with, however, is 
the pragmatic concern of whether including or 
excluding non-hl.UTlal1s will best serve the 
point of any theory of responsibility, any 
theory of how to justifiably regard and re-
spond to beings in light of their deeds. 
The Point of Theories 
of Responsibility 
No doubt the point of theories of re-
sponsibility will first be sought in the 
exacting of retribution or the forward look-
ing enforcement of ethical rules. Isn't that 
what any code of justifiable responses to 
actions is supposed to accamplish for us, to 
exact retribution and/or to enforce rules? 
Well, on reflection, it is clear that this 
will not do. As Jamieson and Regan make 
clear, there is more to being responsible 
than merely being the fit subject of retribu-
tive or rule enforcement interference in our 
affairs. 
In the first place, when we do have 
definite specifications of ethical standards, 
for example, in the fonn of legal statutes or 
recognized moral rules, there is the matter 
of being held to account for apparent depar-
tures from these. And the theory of respon-
sibility includes guides for the conduct of 
this sort of investigative interference. 
Regulating such interference is part of the 
point of such a theory. At the same time, 
however, holding to account is itself neutral 
with respect to retributive and utilitarian 
concerns in punishment or blami.ng. After 
all, one thing that could be determined when 
a being is held to account is that it is not 
liable to blame or punishment, that it would 
be unjustified or out of place to inflict on 
that being a retributive or utilitarian sanc-
tion of some standard. The point of holding 
to account is to determine liability, not to 
administer the very thing to which agents can 
be liable. [9] 
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In addition, the slightest acquaintance 
with the ccmron law will make clear that 
often what goes on in proceedings devoted to 
the determination of responsibility is really 
something different from the enforcement or 
exacting of retribution for breach of parti-
cular, recognized rules. Rather, in common 
law proceedings or any rroral equivalent of 
them, individuals (or, formerly, the state) 
are attempting to decide whether the plain-
tiff has a complaint that merits corrective 
action and then to determine just what fonn 
that action should take. [10] The attempt is 
to provide just relief, if it is deemed that 
. there has been some undue hardship imposed on 
the plaintiff, where this hardship is defined 
in terms other than those of the breaking of 
a particular statute or recognized rule. In 
these cases, the guidance in a theory of 
responsibility does not regulate responses to 
what is generally recognized by some standard 
as intolerable. Instead, it guides us in the 
determination of what is intolerable and in 
providing redress for that to those who have 
suffered from it. Here the functions of 
holding to account and meting out dessert 
are both present, but, in addition, we en-
counter the operation of a quasi-legislative 
or nonn particularizing and specifying func-
tion through which the concrete boundaries of 
the intolerable are delineated. 
Things are much too complex, then, to 
simply say that the point of a theory of 
responsibility is to provide guidance in 
administering retribution or rule enforce-
ment. (Indeed, they are too complex to say 
that the point is to guide the administration 
of systems of retribution and/or rule en-
forcement.) We would be much better off to 
state the point rrore generally as that of 
providing guidance in responding to apparent 
~ of intolerable ~ and in adjudicat-
~ disputes ~ just what is intolerable as 
opposed to tolerable behavior. Put this way, 
the point of theories of responsibility in-
cludes all the accountability, blame and 
punishment assignment, as well as quasi-
legislative or nonn specifying functions 
mentioned above. 
This statement also emphasizes the re-
sponsive character of theories of resp::msi-
bility and in that emphasis, carries the 
implication that the agency of those who are 
in the domain of responsible action is not to 
be interfered with unless that agency has 
apparently become intolerable. In this re-
gard, theories of responsibility, when suited 
to their point, end up treating as ethically 
significant their agents living a life of 
their own, unhampered by the intrusions (and 
worse) of being held to account and blamed or 
punished. They incorporate as a nonnative 
background of interference in a being's life, 
that this interference needs to be justified 
as a response to apparently intolerable beha-
vior, that the being's leading a life of its 
own is prima facie inviolate. 
Who Is In and Who Is Not? 
In giving this characterization, I have 
avoided limiting the behavior in question to 
that of ethical agents, of course. One of 
the aims in this circumspection is to avoid 
begging the question. Going a bit farther 
afield, however, we can notice that questions 
facing the theory of responsibility, in the 
case of even human agents, range beyond is-
sues of how to regard and deal with what is 
the intolerable behavior of one who is or has 
the capacity to be an ethical agent. 
The ethical agent is standardly viewed 
as one who is capable of recognizing what is 
legally, morally, or otherwise expected of 
hirn/her and is open to the influence of that 
expectation on his/her behavior, through an 
appeal to his/her reason. With this in mind, 
there are many examples of individuals stan-
dardly included within the purview of the 
theory of responsibility who are not ethical 
agents and who even lack the capacity to be. 
As we saw, for example, when we hold 
someone to account, we might learn that this 
agent acted in an intolerable way but did not 
do so while open to the rational ~luence of 
ethical guidance, did not do so, then, while 
functioning as an ethical agent. [llj In-
stead, the agent acted while drugged, in a 
rage, in a state of immaturity and ignorance 
of the rules, or in some other incapacitating 
condition. Such agents might well be excused 
from blame and punishment, though they are 
still considered within the purview of the 
theory of responsibility. They might still 
be considered accountable, justifiably 
called upon to defend themselves against 
blame or punishment. Thus, here we have 
responsible agents who are not and need not 
even be capable of being ethical age!1ts. 
The same is true with respect to laws of 
strict liability, according to which an agent 
might be legally subject to fine, or worse, 
for consequences of his/her actions, even 
BE'lWEEN THE SPEI:IES7 
though the act leading to those results was 
not perfonned intentionally and in fact every 
precaution was taken to avert undesirable 
consequences and to follow relevant ethical 
guidelines. Such a one did not act as an 
ethical agent in doing what he/she is consi-
dered responsible for. And so, here again, 
the point of the theory of responsibility is 
to provide guidance in dealing with allegedly 
intolerable acts or the consequences of them, 
regardless even of whether or not the agent 
had the capacity to be an ethical agent in 
performing those acts. 
Clearly, some individuals, so-called 
"moral monsters," for example, also are not 
open to recognizing ethical injunctions, in 
any way involving an appreciation of the full 
weight of the ethical expectation. Or, if 
they can appreciate an ethical injunction, 
they are not open to being influenced by it 
through an appeal to their reason. They are 
monsters, simply because they are unable to 
grasp any ethical calling or only one that 
generally would be considered horribly dis-
torted, such as the injunctions of Hare's 
Nazi zealot. Or, if they are able to grasp 
the idea that there are, for example, univer-
sal ethical restrictions intended for them, 
this fact has no significance for them. They 
could not care less, as the saying goes; they 
are utterly unmoved by such considerations 
and what is more, are not open to such in-
fluences. 
Unfortunately, the limitations on the 
capacities of moral monsters do not always 
come with a limit on the impact that these 
beings may have on the lives of others. As 
we know, moral and other ethical monsters can 
do great harm to others. They lead lives of 
their awn in that they engage in behavior 
that is best exl;llained as free, at least to 
the extent that it is purposive and involves 
them in selectively employing some but not 
all of the elements of their repertoire of 
behavior in order to bring about certain 
consequences. Since these are intolerable to 
someone or other, what these agents have 
done, then, would be most simply explained as 
selecting patterns of behavior whose execu-
tion is in fact, though not as a matter of 
intent, more or less hannful to others. They 
have undertaken something in a purposive way 
such that the intolerable consequences would 
not have ensued, if they had not acted for 
that purpose. Still, in doing so, they need 
not have recognized or even been able to 
recognize and advert to the fact that their 
act was wrong. 
Understood that way, what they have done 
is engage in behavior that is de facto intol-
erable. They have done what is wrong, indeed 
are responsible for what is wrong, though 
they have not acted as ethical agents or in a 
way such that their failure to advert to 
ethical considerations was up to them. 
Still, this is enough for them to be respon-
sible for doing what is wrong. Indeed, we 
take as the ground of our being justified in 
acting against them that they are respon-
sible, as agents, though not as ethical a-
gents, for some doing of wrong. We do this, 
in this way, continuing to grant ethical 
significance to their living a life of their 
awn. It is not that they are worthless 
beings to whom we may (prima facie) do what 
we wish. It is just that their behavior as a 
non-ethical agent is intolerable and some-
thing we must protect ourselves against. 
This need for protection overrides the signi-
ficance properly attached to the agent pursu-
ing his/her purposes (and so living) unham-
pered (a life of his/her awn). It overrides 
the nonnative background condition of theo-
ries of responsibility, the prima facie in-
violateness of a being's living a life of its 
awn. 
Thus, in dealing with humans, three 
sorts of cases arise in which theories of 
responsibility would need to guide us with 
respect to beings which are not and, perhaps, 
even lack the capacity to be ethical agents. 
If a theory of responsibility is to be able 
to fully serve its point, and so be accept-
able, then it should be stated in such a way 
that those who can be responsible for intol-
erable acts need not be capable of appreciat-
ing and being rationally moved by nonnative 
considerations. [12] Adopting a theory of 
responsibility that will handle such cases 
and the others mentioned earlier will allow 
for a wide range of conditions of diminished 
responsibility. Let me now turn to a review 
of some of these and to the question of 
whether non-human animals might enjoy any of 
these types of diminished responsibility. 
Diminished Responsibility 
and Non-human Animals 
Responsibility, then, might be dimin-
ished in many ways below being an ethical 
agent fully accountable and liable for wrong-
doing. Conditions of offenders might leave 
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them accountable but, because justified or 
excused, not liable, that is, not blaaneworthy 
or punishable. They might be accountable but 
not liable, and indeed, so sensitive to being 
singled out in an accusation that their ac-
countability is restricted to only certain, 
minimally threatening occasions. They might 
be liable to blame or punishment of a slight 
degree, for a slight offense, a fate not as 
bad as being singled out by accusation and 
held to account. Thus, they might be liable 
but not accountable. [13] With or without 
accountability, they might be more or less 
fully excused for an offense having an excul-
pating defense or one that gets them off the 
hook only partiallYl what I have called else-
where, a meliorating defense. They might be 
accountable for one offense but, because of 
having a mitigating defense, they might be 
subject to only a reduced amount of blame or 
punishment for another and lesser of-
fense. [14] In addition, if they are ethical 
agents, they might be more or less justified 
in having done what they did and, for that 
reason, less or more liable, whether or not 
they are accountable to some degree. [15] 
As with moral monsters, agents might be 
accountable but not liable, and this might be 
for reasons that render them not ethical 
agents or even potential ethical agents. 
Here, though responsible to a lesser degree 
because of not being liable, they are subject 
to treatment calculated to control them for 
our protection. And, indeed, this control 
might have to take the fonn of killing them. 
Thus, while we have here a lesser degree of 
responsibility, measured in tenus of a lesser 
degree of participation in the system of 
interchanges we mark as elements of responsi-
ble agency, this is hardily a lesser degree 
of responsibility measured in tenus of the 
consequences of one's behavior. Further, 
this very same thing can be found in cases 
where, because we know the being is not an 
ethical agent, we could not justifiably hold 
it to account, call upon it for a defense for 
not adverting to some nann in its behavior. 
Thus, we might have a being that is not 
accountable nor even liable but is subject to 
protective interferences in its life, on our 
part, even to the point of our killing it to 
eliminate a threat that is not otherwise 
predictably controllable. SUch liability to 
controlling interference, with or without 
accountability, is what we shall find in 
cases of dealing with moral monsters, unless 
we presume to utterly discount their worth 
or, that is, the prima facie inviolateness of 
their living their own lives. 
And, it is here, at last, that we seem 
to find a way for nonhuman animals to have 
sane degree of responsibility or innocence. 
They are precluded fran failing to confonn to 
a standard imposed on them as ethical agents 
(and so fran being liable, strictly or not), 
and thus they could not give a defense for 
failing to confonn. No difference would be 
made, then, by allowing them to be held to 
account or to be liable. [16] Jamieson and 
Regan were right about that (even if, for the 
wrong reasons). But it does not follow that 
non-humans have no place in a theory of re-
sponsibility. Jamieson and Regan were wrong 
about that. 
As much as moral monsters, nonhuman 
animals are sometimes responsible agents 
bringing about what is de facto intolerable. 
Let us express this by saying that they are 
"performance" versus intentional agents of 
wrongdoing or by speaking of their "doing 
what is wrong" as opposed to doing wrong. 
And, to coin a use, let us speak of their 
being "controllable" (as opposed to liable to 
punishment) when they are guilty of doing 
what is wrong (as opposed to being guilty of 
wrongdoing) • 
With these conventions in place, we may 
say that some nonhuman animals, as well as 
sane humans, may be accorded the status, 
however diminished, of being responsible 
performance agents which are controllable in 
the face of their doing what is wrong. Other 
nonhuman animals who do no wrong could fail 
to be responsible as performance agents in 
their various pursuits and on that count 
could be said to be innocent. This innocence 
goes with their not being responsible as 
controllable. 
This is not just sanething we can design 
conventions to express, however. Brief re-
flection should make clear that this is the 
appropriate thing to say. Consider one non-
human equivalent of a moral monster. In 
particular, I am thinking of those grizzlies 
of Yellowstone that, for whatever reason, 
seem to have gone crazy. These mad bears now 
take to raiding garbage and, in the face of 
repeated displacements, return time and again 
to taste those forbidden fruits, vegetables, 
and other bits of human food waste. These 
same bears also have included in their ways 
attacks upon humans. Sane of them are kil-
ling sane of us! 
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Here we have animals with a life of 
their own. They engage in behavior that is 
best, i.e. , rrost simply, m:xlestly and power-
fully explained as free to th"l extent that it 
is purposive and involves them in selectively 
employing sane but not all of the elements of 
their repertoire of behavior in order to 
bring about certain consequences. Further, 
they are performance agents of what is wrong. 
On both these counts, and even in lacking the 
status of ethical agents accountable for 
their acts, they are just like scme of the 
moral monsters spoken of earlier. To adjust 
our theory of responsibility to exclude mad 
bears, then, would render it without impact 
in important cases of our dealings with hu-
mans. This, of course, would limit the point 
of that theory beyond our needs. 
On the other hand, providing ourselves 
with the means to deal with mad bears also 
will alleM us the way to talk of innocent 
hares, that is, of all those nonhuman animals 
that have a life of their own but are not 
performance agents doing things that are 
wrong. It alleMs us to recognize the inno-
cence and the attendant freedan fran a judg-
ment of controllability of all those non-
humans that are, as we say, just going about 
their own business. To adjust our theory of 
responsibility in such a way as to disalleM 
the innocence versus guilt of such beings, 
heMever, would lead us at the same time to 
withhold the status of performance innocence 
(as opposed to performance guilt) fran those 
humans we might call "llOral benigns:" inno-
cent children, the Boo Radleys, or others of 
the world who are not ethical agents in their 
actions and, perhaps, are incapable of being 
such, yet who in leading a life of their own 
in fact do nothing which is wrong. 
There seems, then, to be a place of 
responsibility, innocence, and guilt for scme 
non-human animals in ethics that are equipped 
to fully serve the point of theories of re-
sponsibility• If such a theory is strong 
enough to have point with respect even to 
moral monsters and benigns, then the path is 
paved for including as well certain non-human 
animals, those mad bears and innocent hares 
of our world. This place in the danain of 
responsible agency is diminished in having no 
part of accountability or liability. Still, 
it is an area in the danain of responsibility 
large enough to alleM for a form of inno-
cence; guilt, and responsibility for doing 
what is wrong. 
Anim~1 Innocence and the Ethics 
of Animal Experimentation 
Having opened the way for talk of animal 
innocence within the context of questions of 
responsibility, I wish to close with a few 
remarks on the ethical implications of what I 
have wrought. My answer to what Jamieson and 
Regan call "the rroral agent argument" (only 
moral agents can be innocent; non-human ani-
mals cannot be rroral agents; therefore, they 
cannot be innocent) attacks the argument's 
restriction of innocence to ethical agency • 
Jamieson and Regan were right to balk here. 
They were just wrong in why and heM they 
balked. But, so what? 
Does it folleM fran the fact that non-
human animals can be innocent, guilty, and 
responsible for doing wrong that we ought, 
other things being equal, or all things con-
sidered, to cease experimenting on them? It 
is not at all clear why this should be 
thought to follow. 
In the first place, the world is proper-
ly horrified by beliefs that even liability 
to punishment justifies use as an experimen-
tal subject. Who would think that perfor-
mance guilt ensures normative suitability as 
a subject or, then, that performance innocence 
ethically precludes it? 
Further, humans can volunteer for exper-
imentation, even if innocent or guilty. And 
in the absence of ignorance or coercion, that 
does make them ethically fit subjects, at the 
very least overriding any prima facie prohi-
bitions against using them in research. But, 
perhaps that is the rub? Non-humans cannot 
volunteer, and without that clearance, we 
have no right to interfere with their lives? 
Well, if this sort of line is availing, it 
works only for those non-humans that can lead 
a life of their own. It is only these that 
were accorded diminished responsibility in my 
remarks. 
But what of these? Having a life of 
their own does bring them within the protec-
tion of what I called earlier a "normative 
background condition" of theories of respon-
sibility, namely, that, prima facie, a re-
sponsible agent's living a life o~ own is 
ethically inviolate. If the lives of non-
human animals enjoy this status, can that not 
guide us in decisions as to whether or not to 
use the animals in research? If, prima fa-
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cie, we are not to interfere with an animal's 
living its own life--a p:>int we grant in 
giving them even diminished resp:>nsibility--
does it not follCM that, prima facie, we 
ought not to interfere with an animal's liv-
ing its own life just to experiment on it? 
The answer is just not so clear. It 
depends greatly on why it is that their liv-
ing their own life is inviolate. Perhaps it 
is because they themselves enjoy ethical 
standing and so their leading their own lives 
is ethically significant in itself, regard-
less of anything else. If that were so, 
then, yes, the prima facie inviolateness of 
animals ' liVing their own lives would be same 
reason against their being used as experimen-
tal subjects. Recognition of the (perfor-
mance) innocence of non-humans, the fact that 
they have done nothing wrong, would itself 
raise serious questions about their suitabil-
i ty as experimental subjects. [17] 
But what if this were not so? What if 
their living were prima facie inviolate be-
cause they have a kind of contingent impor-
tance, an imp:>rtance dependent upon the ful-
filling of sane other condition, such as the 
fact that sane human(s) championed their 
cause, urging that they be left alone to live 
their own lives? We could have no way of 
knowing without checking whether or not cer-
tain animals had a champion, so that the 
condition of their lives' importance was met. 
Without such a derivative importance, they 
might be, prima facie, a fit subject of ex-
perimentation, while with it they would not 
be. we just would not knCM until we checked. 
In those circumstances, we still might grant 
that it is prima facie wrong to experiment 
upon the animals, at least until we had 
looked into the matter of their derivative 
importance and determined whether or not they 
enjoy the protection of a champion whose 
wishes, prima facie, should be respected. 
Perhaps, to avoid a tragic and presumptuous 
misuse, as a matter of precaution, a non-
human animal's living its own life should be 
treated as prima facie inviolate? What if, 
that is, their inviolateness were derivative 
and first, if not also last, an epistemic 
matter? 
In that case, whether or not animals 
(prima facie) ought to be used in experiments 
would not follON fran their being able to 
lead a life of their own. Instead, only the 
ethical need for a certain caution in select-
ing our experimental subjects would follow: 
"look first and experiment later" would be 
the rule. 
And which of these is it in the end? 
must say that it is the second story that 
seems most acceptable to me. I have argued 
elsewhere that non-humans lack ethical stand-
ing., enjoying for their own lives only impor-
tance derivative upon that of the lives of 
their human champions. [18] In the face of 
that argument, I can only say that non-human 
animals might or might not be fit subjects of 
experimentation, with no reservations. It 
all depends up:>n whether they do not or do 
have human champions. Still, if I am right, 
it is incumbent up:>n the would-be experimen-
ter to check first and experiment only later, 
if at all, to weigh the costs against the 
p:>ssible gains for all concerned before de-
ciding whether and how to proceed. That much 
deference to non-humans with lives of their 
own is called for by the nonnative background 
of animal innocence. [19] 
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Voices rising 
Echo their sire 
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Humankind: take heed 
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Controls the tides 
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And their children are dying 
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